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The ability to get things done: that is a definition of power that great thinkers 
such as Max Weber, Raymond Aron and James Coleman have settled for. In my 
view, they made a mistake. When, for example, Aron writes that “power is the 
capacity to do, make or destroy,” I think he is running ahead too fast. Capacity 
does not flow directly from power. All American presidents are equal in being 
the most powerful (men) in the world but they are everything but equal in ca-
pacity. Reagan was not a success and Nixon a failure because one had power and 
the other did not. Nixon did not fail for want of power, but because he was over-
come by paranoia and destroyed it for himself and his country.
Following Weber, it has become commonplace to consider power as something 
relational. Instead, I would suggest thinking of power as something someone 
has, full stop. It does not sit in behavior or in relationships between people; it 
sits squarely with persons. In that sense, power is what puts someone in a ruling 
position – in the same way a driving license puts someone in the position of 
being a driver. But a driver’s license does not tell us much about the quality of 
the holder’s driving skills. And the possession of power does not tell us much 
about how effective a ruler will be.
Power is at play when governors are up against others. The governor is the one 
who wants something done; the others are the ones he depends on to make it 
happen. Power therefore rests on both sides of this relationship. Power is not 
what governors bring to bear on others, but something that both governors and 
others bring to bear on each other. 
In one extreme, the governor is able to command, others to obey. Here, power is 
on his side. If your country has a conscription army and you are conscripted, 
you must serve. And if the government decides to take the country to war, you 
must go and fight. 
The other extreme is when the governor has no power to command and can rely 
on nothing but persuasion. Now others hold power. On the morning of April 9, 
1999, British health officials issued a warning to prospective parents against 
trying for a millennium baby, April 9 and 10 being the best days for conception. 
Officials were concerned that health services might not be able to cope with an 
unusually high number of deliveries in a night when health workers would want 
to spend celebrating and welcoming the new millennium. The government could 
inform and encourage (or better: discourage), but the power of action was fully 
in the hands of others, in this case of the prospective parents.
In real life, extreme cases where power sits either with the governors or with 
others are probably non-existent. The governor may have the upper hand so 
that others are obliged to follow, but others are never completely without coun-
ter-power. Even in the conscription example, although it is correct to say that 
the government has the power of command, it is too strong to say that others 
have to obey. The soldier sent to the battlefield can still fight badly – that is his 
power. Moreover, soldiers could escape conscription, if only at great cost – for 
example by going into hiding or exile. 
In the other extreme, it may be entirely for others to decide whether or not they 
let themselves be persuaded – but when your government asks something of 
Kurzgefasst: Macht ist im Spiel, wenn 
ein sogenannter Bestimmer den soge-
nannten Anderen gegenübersteht.  
Dabei werden die Bestimmer die  
Anderen nicht für sich einspannen 
können, indem sie einfach nur ihre 
Macht nutzen; vielmehr müssen sie 
geschickt von ihrer Macht Gebrauch 
machen. Zu diesem Zweck müssen sie 
ihre Autorität mobilisieren, und diese 
Autorität fußt auf einem gezügelten 
Gebrauch von Macht. Wie viel Autorität 
ein Bestimmer hat, hängt davon ab, ob 
die Anderen bereit sind, auf ihn zu 
hören und sich von ihm überzeugen 
zu lassen. Auch die Anderen haben 
übrigens Macht – sie können dem 
Bestimmer nämlich die Autorität ab-
sprechen, die er für seine Führungs-
rolle braucht.    
Summary: Power is involved when  
so-called “governors” are up against 
“others.” The ability to get things done 
does not go through power, but 
through the use of power. The effecti-
ve use of power is to motivate others 
to get things done for you. To that end, 
the governor must mobilize authority, 
which again depends on the restrai-
ned use of power. The authority of a 
governor is contained in the willing-
ness of others to listen and be persua-
ded. The ultimate power of others is 
their ability to deny the governor the 
authority he needs to lead. 
It’s about authority, stupid! Having 
power is not enough to get things done
Stein	Ringen
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you, you are under significant pressure to comply. In the millennium baby case, 
the government’s power of persuasion may well have worked since there was 
no rush to hospital of mothers-to-be on New Year’s Eve.
Power, strong as it may appear, is seriously limited since it always has to be 
exercised over someone, which is to say: over individuals with wills of their 
own. It is true that, sometimes, governments simply issue a command, get on 
with it and override resistance. For example the British, Spanish and Italian 
governments in 2003 decided to join the war in Iraq in spite of citizens’ massive 
opposition. But, at least in the British case, not without resistance. As late as a 
week before the invasion, the commander of the British forces, Admiral (later 
Lord) Boyce, demanded written assurance from the prime minister that the war 
would be legal under international law. Behind the demand lay a threat to diso-
bey the order to fight.
It is true that others often have difficulty mobilizing the power they hold, par-
ticularly if this requires spontaneous action by a very large number of people. 
But significant others are not always many. For example, there are just as many 
ministerial top civil servants as ministers. If these top civil servants – on whom 
the ministers depend completely – should ever get together over lunch and 
decide to advise their respective ministers in a co-ordinated manner against 
the government’s plan to reorganize the social security system, the plan would 
be dead in the water. And if you think this sort of thing does not happen in 
government offices, you have not worked there. On the eve of D-day in 1944, 
Churchill ‘dictated an instruction that de Gaulle was to be flown to Algiers, in 
chains if necessary, and a letter to the General ordering him out of Britain. The 
aide who received the instruction ignored it. Eden had the letter burned.’ 
And when others are many, their power is awesome—once mobilized. When 
circumstances conspired in 1989 so that people in East Berlin gelled into a uni-
fied front, the police state crumbled and was unable to prevent them from tea-
ring down the wall behind which they had been locked for decades.
The consequence of my definition of power is that the understanding of rule 
and the ability to get things done does not go through power, but through the 
use of power. Rulers with much power (for example a government with a solid 
majority in the legislature which is the normal situation in Britain) who abuse 
that power will fail. Rulers with less power, like a government dependant on a 
coalition in the legislature (the normal situation in Germany) will succeed if 
that power is wisely employed.
Since governors always depend on others to get things done, the wise use of 
power is to employ it by motivating others to get things done for you. The car-
dinal feature of the polity, Samuel E. Finer said, is “baron-management.” The 
king “could give effect to his orders only through [the barons]. Therefore they 
must be induced to give enthusiastic support (the best outcome) or acceptance 
(the next best) and discouraged from foot-dragging or, at the very worst, open 
resistance.” One does not need much experience in leadership to know that if 
you unleash your power and start bossing people around, you are more likely to 
get resistance than acceptance, never mind enthusiastic support. Said President 
Truman when he handed over to his successor Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Poor Ike. 
He’ll sit right here, and he’ll say ‘Do this, do that!!’ And nothing will happen – it 
won’t be a bit like the army.”
What rulers need in order to get others to do is not so much power as authority. 
A governor has authority when others obey his wishes not only because they 
must, but because they want to. But authority is an elusive commodity. It ap-
pears to rest with the individual. Bismarck ruled Prussia and Germany from 
1862 to 1890 as chancellor and engineered the unification of Germany without 
any conventional political base – simply through his forceful and complex per-
sonality and the king’s/emperor’s backing. 
The authority of a governor is in the eyes of others – just as beauty is in the eye 
of the beholder. When underlings see that spark of authority, it can work won-
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ders. If servants acknowledge their superiors as ‘their lords,’ wrote the obser-
vant Machiavelli, they bear ‘natural affection’ for them. But there is that ‘if’. Au-
thority depends on the willingness of others to listen and be persuaded. No 
governor has any other authority than that which others see in him. He has the 
authority he is able to extract from those he wants to lead and which they are 
willing to award him. Authority enables governors to get others to do for them, 
but at the same time the governor is at the mercy of those same others for the 
authority he needs in order to lead. Authority, then, although appearing to be-
long to the governor, is really a gift from those he wants to exercise authority 
over. The ultimate power of others is their ability to deny the governor the au-
thority he needs to be able to affect them.
 
Some governments, mainly dictatorial ones, only want to hold on to power, so-
metimes just to plunder their country. Serious governments, though, want to do 
something for the country they rule. Their ability to do so, the great thinkers 
have said, depends on their power. I disagree. Dictatorial governments must lean 
on power, but for democratic ones, power is not all it has been cracked up to be. 
Sitting on power does not do governments much good. At best, power can con-
trol others, but on its own, it cannot motivate the others to willing co-operation. 
Games of governments and others, we now see, are shaped mainly by three in-
fluences: power, the use of power, and authority. Power defines the game and 
determines who is governor and who are the governed. As for the use of power, 
while it is more or less a given for the governor, the great variable is his use of 
it. And lastly, the game is shaped decisively by authority and consequently by 
the willingness of others to obey leadership.
The great thinkers are right that the crux is to get things done, but they are 
wrong to consider this a direct function of power. Only leaders who understand 
that governing is an art of authority can succeed. Those who think of it as a 
science of power will fail. On his re-election in 2004, President George W. Bush 
said, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend 
it.” He was right, the election had put him and the Republican Party firmly in 
power. But he squandered his power by disregarding the need for friends both 
at home and abroad. Two years later, in the 2006 mid-term elections, his govern-
ment was in tatters and ultimately, Bush ended his presidency with a reputation 
as one of the least effective leaders in American history. 
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